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Abstract
This paper reviews the literature on one of the most 
meaningful concepts in modern behavioural finance, 
the overconfidence phenomenon. Overconfidence is 
presented as a well-developed psychological theory, 
with main facets comprising miscalibration, better-
than-average effect, illusion of control and unrealistic 
optimism. The primary applications of overconfidence 
in contemporary finance are analysed, from the 
perspective of financial markets and corporate behaviour. 
Experimental studies, formal models and analyses of 
market data demonstrate that overconfidence at least 
partially solves some financial market puzzles that 
cannot be accounted for by standard economic theory. 
Overconfidence in the corporate context may affect not 
only a company’s internal financing structure, but also 
its interactions with other market participants through 
merger and acquisition activity.
Keywords: overconfidence, behavioral finance, investor 
psychology, financial markets, corporate policies, 
overconfident investors
JEL: D8, G1, G32, G34
Streszczenie
W artykule przedstawiono przegląd literatury na 
temat jednej z najważniejszych koncepcji finansów 
behawioralnych: zjawiska nadmiernej pewności 
siebie. Nadmierna pewność siebie jest ukazana jako 
zaawansowana teoria psychologiczna, której głównymi 
aspektami są: brak kalibracji, efekt lepszy niż przeciętny, 
iluzja kontroli i nierealistyczny optymizm. Analizowane 
są zastosowania zjawiska nadmiernej pewności siebie 
w teorii finansów, w kontekście rynków finansowych 
i przedsiębiorstw. Badania eksperymentalne, modele 
teoretyczne i analiza danych rynkowych udowadniają, 
że nadmierna pewność siebie może być częściowym 
rozwiązaniem niektórych zagadek rynku finansowego, 
które nie są wytłumaczalne w ramach konwencjonalnej 
teorii ekonomicznej. Nadmierna pewność siebie w 
perspektywie przedsiębiorstw może mieć wpływ nie tylko 
na wewnętrzną strukturę finansowania tych jednostek, 
ale również na ich interakcje z innymi uczestnikami 
rynku poprzez mechanizmy fuzji i przejęć.
Słowa kluczowe: nadmierna pewność siebie, finanse 
behawioralne, psychologia inwestorów, rynki finansowe, 
polityka przedsiębiorstw, nadmierna pewność siebie 
inwestorów
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1. Introduction
Economics has been strongly increasing its 
interdisciplinary character in the recent years, extensively 
using developments from sociology, psychology and 
even neurology to better explain economic behaviour of 
individual agents and whole markets. Nonetheless, the 
depth of research in all these originally distinct fields 
makes it very tedious to maintain a full picture of the 
original idea, without the oversimplifying shortcuts. 
In order to warn against such oversimplifications 
in the area of behavioural finance, we review one of 
the popular traits studied presently in finance, namely 
the overconfidence phenomenon. On the intuitive level 
overconfidence seems a clear concept and this may be 
the reason for its somewhat scanty definitions used 
in some behavioural finance research. The aim of this 
paper is to present overconfidence as a well developed 
psychological concept, and describe its origins, forms 
and definitions, as well as to summarise the main 
applications of overconfidence in the current finance 
research. Our extensive treatment of overconfidence 
in the psychological part aims to demonstrate that the 
nature and reasons for overconfidence continue to be 
discussed among psychologists, with some of them 
going as far as to claim that the phenomenon itself does 
not exist. Thus, applying overconfidence to economic 
models as a “well-established fact” should be treated 
with caution, as it seems to be a developing field within 
psychology itself. In addition, putting together different 
and distinct measures of overconfidence, which can be 
found in some of the finance and economics literature, 
is not necessarily practised by psychologists and 
from that point of view may represent an important 
oversimplification. Although “believing we know more 
than we truly know” and “believing we are better than 
others” may seem to mean almost the same thing, 
psychological research sets these two beliefs clearly 
apart. In our paper we outline the most important 
aspects of overconfidence found in the psychological 
literature to avoid similar misconceptions.
Our brief overview of finance research demonstrates 
that applying even a general concept of overconfidence 
allows to account for many phenomena in finance 
that the standard economic theory does not explain. 
Some examples are excessive trading volumes on 
financial markets, persisting security misvaluations 
or unfavourable acquisitions undertaken by some 
companies. The economic effect of overconfidence on 
financial markets and companies has been under closer 
scrutiny for some time now and the studies continue to 
grow, with the most important ones included into the 
mainstream of finance research.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides 
an overview of the main findings on overconfidence in 
psychology, dividing it into miscalibration and positive 
illusions concepts. We present various definitions of 
and reasons for overconfidence and review an important 
discussion on its very existence among psychologists. We 
conclude this part with a summary of expert calibration, 
as studied by psychologists. Section 3 describes the 
main applications of overconfidence in finance research, 
split between the financial markets and the corporate 
finance area. Section 4 concludes.
2. Overconfidence in psychology
The term “overconfidence” has been widely used in 
psychology starting from the 1960s. As researchers in 
other fields, including economics, have stretched its 
meaning beyond its original definition, we will try to 
include in our review the most popular extensions and 
interpretations of overconfidence that are currently 
being studied in economics and finance. Overconfidence 
in psychology is most closely related to the calibration 
and probability judgment research and the term 
itself is frequently equalled with one of the forms of 
miscalibration.1 The most important extensions to this 
definition scope, usually applied by economists, are 
studies of overconfidence in the context of positive 
illusions, i.e. the better-than-average effect, illusion of 
control and unrealistic optimism. The review discusses 
psychological studies on overconfidence separately for 
each of the above categories, to highlight differences 
between them, even if economists tend to regard them 
jointly. 
2.1. Overconfidence as miscalibration
In psychology, calibration is usually studied on the basis 
of general knowledge questions generated by researchers 
(e.g. comparisons of population sizes of different cities 
or their geographical position). Experiment participants 
answer sets of questions and after each particular item 
(or after a set of questions or at the end of the whole task) 
have to assess the probability that the given answer (or 
the whole set) was correct. Appropriate calibration takes 
place “if over the long run, for all propositions assigned 
a given probability, the proportion that is true is equal 
to the probability assigned” (Fischhoff et al. 1977, p. 
552). Putting it bluntly, a well-calibrated judge is able to 
correctly assess the amount of mistakes he makes. 
Miscalibration is the difference between the 
accuracy rate and probability assigned (that a given 
answer is correct). Overconfidence has been defined 
as a particular form of miscalibration, for which the 
assigned probability that the answers given are correct 
exceeds the true accuracy of the answers. This rough 
definition of overconfidence as a form of miscalibration 
1  See for example Brenner et al. (1996); Dawes and Mulford (1996); Fischhoff 
et al. (1977; 1980).
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has been widely used by psychologists since the end of 
the 1970s. An even shorter description was provided by 
Oskamp (1965) in his analysis of psychologists’ clinical 
judgment, where overconfidence is studied simply as an 
excess of confidence over accuracy. Oskamp proved that 
confidence in expressed judgment and accuracy of this 
judgment lie far apart and they may diverge further, as 
the confidence of a judge may grow during an evaluation 
task, while his accuracy remains largely unchanged. 
He found a significant mismatch between the level of 
confidence (53%) expressed by clinical psychologists and 
their diagnosis accuracy rate (28%), which indicated a 
high degree of overconfidence, defined later by Fischhoff 
et al. (1980, p. 108) as “an unwarranted belief in the 
correctness of one’s answers”.
Oskamp’s general conclusions have been 
specified further in later judgment calibration studies. 
Overconfidence was found in a series of experiments, 
including general knowledge questions, by Fischhoff 
et al. (1977) and it proved especially strong for items 
where the participants were certain, or almost certain, 
of being right. Overconfidence prevails even if specific 
instructions as to the nature of probability and 
calibration are presented to experiment participants. 
Introducing financial incentives to reward correct 
calibration does also not change the picture (Fischhoff 
et al. 1977). Improved calibration results from 
instructing participants to consider reasons supporting 
and opposing chosen hypotheses in the experiment of 
Fischhoff et al. (1980). Overconfidence diminishes in 
such a case due to a mixture of two results, a decrease 
in declared confidence and an increase in the number 
of correct answers. Important factors influencing the 
level of overconfidence comprise also the presence (or 
lack) of clear and rapid feedback, and a repetitive and 
simple nature of the task, implying that calibration may 
fluctuate (Lichtenstein et al. 1982; Russo, Schoemaker 
1992). Nonetheless, the discussion as to whether 
overconfidence is a steady trait or a dynamic process 
subject to manipulation has not yielded conclusive 
answers to date.
One of the essential concepts in overconfidence 
research, identified already by Fischhoff et al. (1977), is 
a so-called “hard-easy effect”. This finding demonstrates 
that overconfidence surfaces mostly in difficult or 
very difficult tasks, while easy tasks may generate 
underconfidence (where the proportion of correct 
answers exceeds expressed probability judgment). The 
hard-easy effect was strongly confirmed by Lichtenstein 
et al. (1982) and has been present in most calibration 
research since then. 
The next sub-sections will briefly outline two 
important discussions among psychologists within 
the miscalibration area, concerning the reasons for 
overconfidence and its very existence.
 
Reasons for overconfidence
Despite extensive research on overconfidence, its origins 
or reasons for its existence have not been clearly and 
unanimously defined. Many researchers either take it for 
granted, or analyse its degree, but its roots are still being 
debated. Although this seems to be much more an area 
of interest and further exploration for psychologists, its 
meaning for other fields (such as economics) is crucial, 
as only the identification of the origins of overconfidence 
may allow to find measures mitigating it, or spurring it, 
if necessary.
Several psychological reasons for overconfidence 
emerge in the literature. Keren (1997) divides them 
into cognitive and motivational ones (overconfidence 
as a self-motivating mechanism). Similarly, Russo and 
Schoemaker (1992) name cognitive, psychological and 
motivational areas. Cognitive reasons include biases, 
which may be alleviated by accelerated and accurate 
feedback, counter argumentation, or careful consideration 
of the problem. The motivational side exposes the need 
to believe in one’s efficacy to make progress. 
Within the cognitive process, various reasons may 
lead to the misalignment of confidence and accuracy. 
Overconfidence may arise due to faults in the process 
of arriving at answers which are not readily stored in 
memory, or the erroneous belief that answers are stored in 
memory, when it is not the case. The reconstructive nature 
of memory and perception creates room for errors, without 
the subjects realising them. In addition, the selective 
nature of memory, bringing the more “salient” items into 
the foreground, causes further mistakes in generating 
answers, while leaving the confidence levels unchanged 
(Fischhoff et al. 1977). There is also no certainty as to when 
miscalibration arises, be it while forming the confidence 
judgment or later, while translating that judgment into a 
probability (Fischhoff et al. 1980).
A partly cognitive and partly motivational reason for 
overconfidence is a so-called confirmation bias, widely 
explored in the literature. A confirmation bias arises 
with the excessive usage of confirming evidence (for a 
chosen hypothesis) and the negligence of contradictory 
arguments by experiment participants. The improvement 
in calibration following a specific instruction to consider 
both kinds of evidence documented by Fishhoff et al. 
(1980) strongly supports the role of the confirmation 
bias in the emergence of overconfidence. In addition, 
confidence judgments seem to be related primarily to 
the amount and strength of supporting, rather than 
contradicting, evidence and the latter has very little, 
if any, bearing on the confidence judgment formation 
as such (Fischhoff et al. 1980). The confirmation bias 
argumentation thus implies that miscalibration is not 
merely a cognitive mistake during the translation of 
the confidence judgment into a numerically expressed 
probability. 
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The discussion of the reasons for overconfidence 
also includes the hard-easy effect. Although in most 
research this effect is a standard finding, some authors 
claim that in fact (unnaturally) difficult questions are the 
reason that overconfidence emerges at all and without 
these no miscalibration is observed.2 A more detailed 
discussion of this can be found in the next sub-section. 
An already mentioned factor influencing overconfidence 
is the presence (or lack) of clear, rapid feedback, which 
in some cases may lead to perfect calibration, such as 
enjoyed by US weather forecasters (see research quoted 
in Lichtenstein et al. 1982).
Originating from the faulty cognitive processing, the 
next important area of potential sources of overconfidence 
emerges, namely the heuristics and biases argumentation. 
Discussed in detail by Kahneman and Tversky (1982), it 
points at three main heuristics that could play important 
roles in spurring overconfidence, namely:
– the representativeness heuristic, 
– the availability heuristic, 
– the adjustment and anchoring heuristic. 
The representativeness heuristic consists of 
phenomena such as base-rate neglect (ignoring prior 
probabilities that directly impact the final probability), 
sample size neglect (where generalised conclusions are 
drawn on the basis of very small samples), misconceptions 
of probability (including the “gambler’s fallacy”, where 
spinning a roulette wheel is expected to “certainly” 
result in a “red” after a series of “blacks”), insensitivity 
to predictability (using rather the favourability of a 
description than its reliability), illusion of validity 
(confidence in items matching certain stereotypes, even 
if their descriptions are unreliable) and, last but certainly 
not least, failure to appreciate a regression to the mean 
(assigning various causes to events which in fact are just 
a regression towards the mean). 
The availability heuristic causes people to assess 
the frequency or probability of an event by the easiness 
with which they bring to mind similar situations or 
items. As a result more drastic events will seem more 
frequent than is really the case, only because they are 
remembered more vividly due to their drastic character. 
Illusory correlation is also part of the availability 
heuristic, where people mistake co-occurrence of events 
with interdependence between them. Anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic can be observed when people 
anchor their initial assessment at some level (which 
may be completely random) and then adjust the final 
judgment in relation to this anchor, but the adjustment 
is usually not sufficient. 
Griffin and Tversky (1992) confirm the importance 
of the representativeness heuristic and the anchoring 
and adjustment heuristic, concluding from their 
studies that a role played by the “strength” of evidence 
(i.e. its “extremeness”) largely exceeds that of its 
2  See for example Gigerenzer et al. (1991); Juslin (1994).
”weight” (predictive validity, credibility, sample size 
etc.). Overconfidence emerges when strength is high 
and weight is low. In a series of studies the authors 
confirm also the existence of the hard-easy effect, with 
overconfidence being dramatically high for extremely 
difficult, “impossible” items.
Some researchers associate differing levels of 
overconfidence with gender issues, which accommodates 
the common belief of men being more confident than 
women given the same level of knowledge. Nonetheless, 
the link between gender differences and overconfidence 
has not been unequivocally established. In an attempt to 
demonstrate that women underestimate their abilities and 
performance, Beyer (1990) establishes that expectancies 
have a significant effect on self-evaluations, but the 
men-women differences in overconfidence itself are not 
very strong. No significant gender differences are found 
by Lundeberg et al. (1994) in single item assessments of 
confidence (as opposed to general confidence studies), 
with comparable overconfidence emerging for both sexes, 
especially for wrong answers. Meaningful discrepancies 
in self evaluation (general evaluation of performance 
on the whole task) and calibration (evaluation of single 
items) in specifically masculine tasks performed by men 
and women are demonstrated by Beyer and Bowden 
(1997).3 However, the discrepancies between sexes 
demonstrated by these studies are not dramatic and 
depend on the context. Despite this, some economists 
use gender as a proxy for overconfidence in financial 
tasks, where men are inclined to feel more competent 
than women (e.g. Barber, Odean 2001) and indeed 
gender differences are confirmed.
The last, most extreme group of reasons for 
overconfidence put forward by Gigerenzer et al. (1991), 
are faulty procedures on the side of researchers studying 
overconfidence. Gigerenzer et al. reject cognitive or 
motivational factors influencing or causing overconfidence 
and attribute it largely to a (biased) structure of the task 
and its relation to the environment. If this is corrected, 
calibration will be close to perfect. The major findings of 
Gigerenzer et al. are presented below.
Overconfidence – fiction or fact?
A heated discussion among psychologists on the sources 
of overconfidence and its prevalence was started, among 
others, by Gigerenzer et al. (1991). They constructed 
a new model of confidence, the probabilistic mental 
model (PMM) and questioned the very existence of 
overconfidence. They argued that its foundations were 
faulty structures of studies rather than true cognitive 
biases affecting judgments. According to the PMM, 
3  A masculine task is a task at which both sexes believe that men perform bet-
ter. Beyer and Bowden (1997) use a sports question set as a masculine task and 
a show business question set as a feminine task. Other examples of masculine 
areas cited by Beyer and Bowden (1997) are e.g. mathematics, physics, technical 
problems etc. 
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people are good judges of what they know provided this 
concerns their natural environment. Previous studies 
would make subjects answer questions that were not 
representative of their natural environments or, even 
if they were, researchers hand-picked them so that 
they were more difficult than it seemed, which caused 
overconfidence to appear. Overconfidence disappears 
if questions are chosen randomly and the hard-easy 
effect does not always prevail. Depending on the task, 
“overconfidence and the hard-easy effect emerge, 
disappear, and invert at will” (Gigerenzer et al. 1991, p. 
526). Despite the fact that these results were not confirmed 
by other researchers, the “well-established” nature of 
overconfidence has been put to further verification.4 
Random selection of items was experimentally proven 
by Juslin (1994) to significantly mitigate overconfidence, 
while including hand-picked questions increased it. The 
prevalence of overconfidence and the hard-easy effect as 
a general cognitive bias across domains has been strongly 
reduced and some results were associated with faulty 
interpretations of regression effects (Dawes, Mulford 
1996). The degree of overconfidence may be modified 
by the distribution of correct and wrong answers and 
the methodology of analysing the answer patterns.5 A 
random error component in judgment is introduced in 
Soll’s (1996) modification of the PMM, where confidence 
is a function of the validity of information and of the 
random error. In this model, the interaction between 
the random error and the environment, as well as 
unrepresentative questions and biases, all contribute 
to overconfidence, while the existence of the hard-easy 
effect is proven experimentally, contrary to Gigerenzer’s 
original findings. Further extensions of Gigerenzer’s 
methodology comprise an introduction of a stochastic 
component in judgment, in addition to various forms 
of errors, and analysing factors like response modes 
(half-range or full range), the structure of questions and 
the participants’ learning process (Juslin et al. 1997). A 
causal relation between the data analysis methodology 
and subsequent calibration results is demonstrated by 
Ayton and McClelland (1997), spanning diverse findings 
from overconfidence as a methodological illusion 
(Gigerenzer et al. 1991; Juslin 1994), through a strong 
impact of random error (Soll 1996; Juslin et al. 1997), 
up to overconfidence as a pervasive effect caused by 
cognitive biases. 
Numerous researchers argued with the above-
stipulated illusory nature of overconfidence, proving 
the existence of miscalibration. Overconfidence may 
not be “made to disappear” as claimed by Gigerenzer 
et al. (1991) and Juslin (1994), as long as the questions 
are difficult enough and thus the hard-easy effect 
4  Griffin and Tversky (1992) confirm the existence of overconfidence in a gen-
eral knowledge task with randomly selected questions, representative of the 
environment.
5  Note, however, that Wallsten (1996) does not regard such methodological mis-
takes as sufficient grounds to reject the existence of miscalibration as such.
prevails.6  As pointed out by Griffin and Tversky 
(1992), an important role in spurring overconfidence is 
played by biases, as people attach more attention to the 
“strength” of evidence (“extremeness”) rather than to its 
“weight2 (predictive validity, e.g. sample size, credibility 
of arguments). Strength participates in the cognitive 
processes at the stage of forming the initial hypothesis 
and weight is only taken into account to adjust the 
final answer, but this adjustment is usually not enough 
to outweigh the mistakes made in forming the initial 
impression. This is parallel to the processes of anchoring 
and adjustment proposed by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1982). Griffin and Tversky (1992) demonstrate that 
overconfidence could be mitigated if people recognised 
that evidence they use fits an alternative hypothesis 
equally well. Overconfidence is found to reach its 
maximum in single item evaluation and to drastically 
diminish in assessments of overall task performance. 
This has been found already by Gigerenzer et al. (1991) 
and is sometimes used as an argument to reduce the 
effect of overconfidence as such. However, the case-by-
case nature of decision making in general and the diverse 
bases of single item and overall task performance does 
not allow to dismiss miscalibration on these grounds. 
As pointed out by Brenner et al. (1996), single items are 
evaluated according to arguments for and against a given 
hypothesis, while an overall judgment is formed on the 
basis of perception of task difficulty, knowledge of the 
judge, or past experience with similar tasks. Brenner 
et al. (1996) experimentally demonstrates that if these 
evaluations are based on the same evidence, they result 
in miscalibration being equal. 
The misconception of regression effects and their 
interpretation as overconfidence put forward by Dawes 
and Mulford (1996) are rejected by Griffin and Varey 
(1996), which also introduce a differentiation between 
optimistic overconfidence (belief that our favoured 
outcome will occur in the future) and overestimation of 
one’s knowledge (with no favoured hypothesis involved). 
Aggregation and faulty analysis of data is recognised to 
affect overconfidence, but it is not sufficient to make it 
disappear altogether. Questionnaire studies of various 
professions prove the existence of overconfidence 
(Russo, Schoemaker 1992), with the exception of US 
weather forecasters, where calibration is almost perfect. 
This finding proves the crucial role of accurate, precise 
and timely feedback in eliminating overconfidence, 
both in the sense of miscalibration and the better-than-
average effect (Russo, Schoemaker 1992).7 The analyses 
of the development of calibration and probability 
research done by Keren (1991) and Keren (1997) support 
the hypothesis of robustness of overconfidence and 
hard-easy effects, despite possible methodological flaws 
in the process of measuring or assessing calibration. 
6  See for example Griffin,Tversky (1992), Brenner et al. (1996).
7  For a detailed description of the better-than-average effect see section 2.2.
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Similarly, an overview of Klayman et al. (1999) finds 
that even if question framing, response mode and 
unsystematic error have all been experimentally found 
to influence miscalibration and important individual 
differences between levels of overconfidence emerge, 
overconfidence as a phenomenon still prevails. More 
recent meta-studies of overconfidence, including the 
expert judgment study of Koehler et al. (2002) and 
the summary of probability calibration of Brenner 
and Griffin (2004) assume overconfidence as a well-
established fact, even if allowing for some criticisms as 
to the methodology of measuring it or its various causes. 
Brenner and Griffin (2004) propose their own structure 
in calibration research, with the main areas being 
optimistic overconfidence (building on the self-serving 
bias, the better-than-average effect, unrealistic optimism 
and illusion of control), confirmatory bias (seeking 
evidence which confirms only our already formed, 
original hypothesis), case-based judgment (the heuristics 
and biases area), ecological models (e.g. Gigerenzer et al. 
1991; Juslin 1994) and error models (e.g. Soll 1996). All 
these fields are seen as possible causes or explanations 
of miscalibration, with none of the aspects per se being 
able to fully explain miscalibration. In our paper we use 
a slightly different approach to overconfidence, similar 
to the one applied by Glaser and Weber (2007), dividing 
it into miscalibration and other positive illusions (better-
than-average effect, unrealistic optimism and illusion 
of control). The last area in miscalibration studies, the 
expert calibration, is shortly described below.
Expert calibration
Apart from the numerous experimental studies on 
miscalibration of lay people (students answering 
general knowledge questions), psychologists analysed 
various professionals with respect to their potential 
overconfidence. In general, the conclusions here are 
mixed, depending on the profession and task difficulty. 
Lichtenstein et al. (1982) found highly differing results, 
with weak calibration displayed by physicians and 
excellent calibration showed by US weather forecasters 
and horse-betting commentators in a UK newspaper. 
The crucial role of feedback here has already been 
mentioned earlier in the paper. Griffin and Tversky 
(1992) find experts better calibrated than lay people if the 
predictability of a task is high, while experts are much 
more prone to overconfidence than lay people if it is very 
low. Juslin (1994) claims that if a task is generated on the 
basis of an expert’s work environment, overconfidence 
will not emerge. This clearly goes against the findings 
of Lichtenstein et al. on calibration of physicians. Keren 
(1997) on the other hand discusses bridge experts 
calibration, with amateur players showing considerable 
overconfidence and expert players calibrated almost 
perfectly. He underlines the difference between accuracy 
(usually carefully studied) and resolution (also called 
discrimination – an ability to judge whether an event 
will take place or not), as there is no agreement 
whether these are two forms of expertise or rather two 
different kinds of expertise8. A meta-analysis of expert 
judgment performed by Koehler et al. (2002) finds 
mixed results for various professional groups, such 
as physicians, weather forecasters, lawyers, business 
professionals and sports experts. Overall, the existence 
of systemic miscalibration is confirmed, but its strength 
differs. Little evidence for optimistic bias is found, apart 
from the situation where the judgments concern the 
subjects themselves. Generally, probability judgments 
reflect evidence supporting a given hypothesis (meaning 
the “strength” of evidence), with little regard to the 
reliability of that evidence (“weight”) or the base rate of 
the outcome (prior probability that should be included 
in the “final” probability). In addition, Koehler et al. 
(2002) declare that while expertise improves resolution 
(ability to discriminate between more and less likely 
events) it does not ensure good calibration (ability to 
assess a probability of a given outcome in itself).
2.2. Overconfidence as a sign of other positive illusions
Although psychological research primarily concentrates 
on overconfidence seen as a form of miscalibration, 
a part of psychological overconfidence studies extends 
beyond that scope. The main secondary area relates to 
positive illusions, including the better-than-average effect, 
unrealistic optimism and illusion of control. Although 
positive illusions are not in the foreground of psychological 
debates on overconfidence, their impact is much more 
pronounced in applied fields, such as economics and 
finance. Moreover, some studies in economics and 
finance do not precisely define overconfidence, and do 
not introduce a distinction between the miscalibration 
and positive illusions approach. Thus it is important 
to keep these distinctions in mind for a more thorough 
understanding of underlying psychological processes and 
findings that directly influence the agents’ behaviour. In 
the following sections we shortly describe each of the 
main types of positive illusions, even if despite definitional 
differences they frequently overlap in theoretical and 
experimental studies.
Better-than-average effect
Psychological research has established that, in general, 
people tend to have an unrealistically positive view of 
themselves. Most of us, when comparing ourselves to a 
group (of co-students, co-workers, random participants), 
believe to be superior to an average representative of that 
group in various fields. On the aggregate level this seems 
8  This division is also discussed by other authors, e.g. Koehler et al. (2002).
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a statistical impossibility. Studies of a so-called “better-
than-average effect” attempt to determine whether and 
to what extent people feel superior to their peers, what 
reasons this may have and which areas it influences. 
The better-than-average effect is often included by 
psychologists in the overconfidence research, but it 
is certainly overshadowed by miscalibration studies 
within psychological literature. However, economists 
have taken the better-than-average effect under closer 
scrutiny, and it is frequently used as an equivalent of 
overconfidence as such, with little or no attention paid 
to the miscalibration phenomenon. In a sense, the better-
than-average effect can be seen as a form of miscalibration, 
where the subjects are not comparing their answers or 
performance to an “objective” benchmark (e.g. the true 
size of a city in question) but to their subjective view 
of the other subjects’ outcome. Thus the main question 
here is not (or at least, not only) whether the subjects 
believe their answers to be better than they really are, 
but if they believe their answers are better than the 
average answers.
The better-than-average effect may affect various 
fields of human activities. A well-known study of the 
better-than-average effect carried out by Svenson (1981) 
demonstrated that while comparing themselves with 
others, people generally believe to be more skilful and 
less risky drivers than an “average” driver, without a 
prior definition or knowledge on the “average” driving 
skills. The better-than-average effect, as studied by 
Taylor and Brown (1988), consists of various factors, 
such as a belief that positive traits describe us more 
accurately than an average person, an assessment of 
others from the perspective of our own positive traits, 
and a form of a self-serving bias in self-assessment. The 
self-serving bias analysed by Taylor and Brown (1988) 
makes people assign more responsibility for success and 
less for failure to themselves, while others are not given 
the same credit. The exception to the rule are relatives or 
close friends, who are also granted the same favourable 
treatment. Moreover, it may be extended even further 
to “primitive” groups, implying that even a low level 
of group integration may result in biased, favourable 
treatment of group members. An extensive analysis of 
self-serving biases in the attribution of causality can 
be found in a meta-study by Miller and Ross (1975). Its 
primary finding from extensive research indicates that 
people tend to attribute own success largely to internal 
reasons (such as knowledge, preparation) rather than 
external ones (such as luck).
The existence of the better-than-average effect has 
been proven in various experimental settings. Alicke 
et al. (1995) study the better-than-average effect as 
one of self-serving biases allowing people to maintain 
a relatively high level of self-esteem. The better-than-
average effect is found to diminish if the object of 
comparison is made to be a real person, any real person, 
about whom no further information is produced. This 
reduction is more marked if a personal contact with the 
comparison object is established, even if the contact 
is limited to reading of video recording transcripts. 
Nonetheless, even if diminished, the better-than-average 
effect persists. Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) also 
believe the better-than-average effect to be partly caused 
by a self-serving bias, the existence of which they prove 
in numerous experiments and find that it is pertinent 
and difficult to alleviate. The bias they use is a tendency 
to be biased towards our own interest and perceive 
fairness as something which benefits ourselves. As a 
result, agents believe their contribution to a joint task to 
be higher than is really the case, and their information 
processing for outcomes with personal involvement is 
different than for those of third party involvement. 
The existence of the better-than-average effect, 
similarly to that of miscalibration, has also been 
questioned in the literature. Its emergence was attributed 
by Dunning et al. (1989) to the usage of ambiguous 
definitions in psychological studies (such as e.g. 
“competence”, “excellence”). Self-descriptions chosen 
by experiment participants only seem overconfident, 
or “better than average”, but in fact they are just 
individual interpretations of a vague definition. Once 
the definitions are no longer subject to interpretation but 
are restricted and generated externally, the comparison 
towards others becomes more accurate. This conclusion 
of Dunning et al. (1989) may seem plausible, but the 
important classification as to the acceptance of external 
and strict definition limits its impact significantly. In 
most cases people do use personal interpretations of 
seemingly “objective” traits, and making them accept 
new definitions, especially if these are less favourable 
towards themselves, is questionable.
In the financial literature, a recent theoretical 
study of Benoit and Dubra (2007) questions the claimed 
irrationality of the better-than-average effect.9 The 
example of driving abilities is used to illustrate their main 
point, where the population consists of high, medium 
and low skilled drivers, with respective probabilities of 
causing an accident of 0, 2/5 and 4/5. The skill levels are 
accorded randomly, each with the same probability of 
1/3. After the first period of driving, drivers assess their 
skills in comparison to the remaining population and 
come up with probabilities, derived according to Bayes’ 
rule, of 5/9 (high skill), 3/9 (medium skill) and 1/9 (low 
skill). As a result, all drivers with no accident rationally 
believe that there is a 5/9 chance that they belong to 
the high skilled part of the population. As 3/5 of the 
drivers would not have caused an accident, they all 
have rational grounds to believe to be above average (or 
mean, as indicated by the authors). The authors proceed 
to formalise their approach, using a signalling model 
9  This was pointed out by one of the referees. We are grateful for this 
suggestion.
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framework, where the data is rationalised in various 
ways depending on the usage of the median or mean 
beliefs during comparisons to the general population. 
Although the concept of “apparent overconfidence”, as 
the authors call it, is very interesting, some assumptions 
within the model differ from the usual overconfidence 
framework. Both in the driving skills example and 
throughout the paper, an assumption of rational learning 
patterns is assumed, where people update their initial 
beliefs using Bayes’ rules, after receiving their signals 
and updating (in a rational pattern). The very important 
concept of biased self-attribution, mentioned above and 
discussed further in the financial literature context (e.g. 
Daniel et al. 1998; Gervais and Odean 2001) is omitted 
here, while other authors claim it to be an underlying 
process of forming overconfident beliefs as such. Benoit 
and Dubra (2007) also make a strong claim that if people 
have no information about themselves (e.g. on some 
unknown skill) they will rate themselves as average, 
which we find somewhat controversial. They also claim 
that overconfidence cancels out in the large population, 
as they formally prove the existence of underconfidence 
for difficult and overconfidence for easy tasks. This 
stands in clear opposition to the well known hard-easy 
effect (discussed in section 2.1), where under- and 
overconfidence surface exactly in the opposite settings. 
Nonetheless, we believe that the criticism of Benoit 
and Dubra (2007) constitutes a welcome “rational” 
direction in the analysis of the better-than-average effect, 
which should not be taken for granted, neither in the 
psychological nor financial literature.10
Although the scope of psychological research on the 
better-than-average effect is much narrower than that of 
probability calibration, its application and analysis in 
the field of economics and finance is more extensive. The 
relative simplicity of the concept allows straightforward 
comparisons between data sets, and potential survey 
studies do not demand an advanced structure, unlike 
much more detailed questionnaires on miscalibration. 
Unrealistic optimism
Unrealistic optimism, or a so-called optimistic bias, is 
frequently analysed in the context of the better-than-
average effect and biased self-attribution. In general, 
unrealistic optimism towards the future can be seen as 
an error in evaluating future events, either in the sense of 
the better-than-average effect (e.g. when all or most people 
believe their chances of achieving financial success are 
higher than the “average” person’s) or in absolute terms 
(when people believe their chance of winning a lottery are 
higher than the true probability). The shortest definition 
of several findings in that area could be “The future will 
be great, especially for me” (Taylor, Brown 1988, p. 197). 
In his famous paper Weinstein (1980) experimentally 
10  See Benoit, Dubra (2007) for further references.
analyses different aspects of people’s optimism towards 
the future, with participants comparing their chances 
of a potential fortune or misfortune to an average’ 
person. People are found to believe that positive events 
are more likely to happen to them than to others, with 
the opposite valid for negative events. This effect 
increases for especially desired occurrences, events with 
objectively higher probabilities and events perceived to 
be controllable (such as e.g. passing an exam). People 
believe that negative experiences would rather affect 
a subjectively formed (and often wrong) stereotypical 
“representative”, which obviously they do not resemble. 
These comparisons clearly overlap with the better-than-
average research, with the qualification that they refer to 
future events. Unrealistic optimism is reduced through 
a careful re-examination of own and others’ chances and 
reasons for success, but it does not disappear, which 
indicates that it is not of a purely motivational origin 
(reducing anxiety) but may be caused by cognitive 
errors. The optimistic bias is persistent for both positive 
and negative events, especially if these are perceived to 
be controllable and people attach commitment to them 
or have invested emotionally in them. 
Illusion of control
Psychological research and common observation 
demonstrate that people tend to believe they are able 
to influence events which in fact are governed mainly, 
or purely, by chance (Taylor, Brown 1988). An extreme 
example of this illusion is an insistence on throwing 
a dice personally as if it could then show a more 
favourable result. Moreover, if people expect certain 
outcomes and these outcomes do occur, the participants 
are prone to assign them to their doing rather than luck, 
and re-affirm their belief in control over a situation 
where the only factor is probability. 
The existence of illusion of control in purely chance-
driven tasks has repeatedly been proven experimentally, 
with the participants convinced that their skill or past 
experience can influence the outcome of predicting the 
result of the task (Langer, Roth 1975). After some result 
manipulations in a coin-tossing task, Langer and Roth 
(1975) led rational participants to believe they are able 
to better predict the outcome of coin-tossing than others 
and were convinced that their success in predictions 
was not pure chance, but that they were able to “control” 
the outcome. If certain factors usually involved in 
situations depending on skill, such as competition, 
choice, familiarity or involvement, are introduced into 
purely chance-driven tasks, individuals will believe 
they control the tasks more than the probability itself 
indicates (Langer 1975). Illusion of control is found by 
Langer (1975) in a variation of experiments on chance-
driven tasks, including a participation of a confident or 
a nervous competitor, choosing lottery tickets or being 
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assigned one, engaging in familiar or unfamiliar lotteries 
or chance games, making own guesses or through a 
proxy. In all these situations participants are found 
to express excessive confidence in their control over 
outcomes of chance-driven tasks. A meta-analysis of 
Presson and Benassi (1996) documents the prevalence of 
illusion of control effects across a wide range of studies 
and experimental variations. Situational variables which 
were found to increase the illusion of control comprised 
choice (people value lottery tickets with self-chosen 
numbers more than those with randomly chosen), 
outcome sequence (experiment participants receiving 
positive feedback on a pure chance task in an early stage 
of the experiment tend to believe their control to be 
higher than the control of those with positive feedback 
towards the end of the trial), familiarity with the task, 
information regarding the outcome of the task and 
active involvement in the task. Nonetheless, few authors 
measure illusory control as such and frequently use 
proxies instead. These proxies include the participants’ 
judgments of their prediction ability, judgments of 
contingency, willingness to trade lottery tickets, or 
even participants’ confidence on succeeding on a task. 
Especially this last item makes illusion of control studies 
closer to overconfidence. Indeed, Presson and Benassi 
(1996) propose to use the term “illusory judgment” 
instead, to better convey different effects found in the 
underlying research, including participants’ judgments 
of their prediction ability. This seems to align more with 
the overconfidence definitions in term of miscalibration 
than the effect of illusion of control per se.
To conclude this part, we would like to mention an 
interesting finding presented by Taylor and Brown (1988) 
in their study of relations between positive illusions 
(unrealistically positive self-evaluations, exaggerated 
perceptions of control and mastery and unrealistic 
optimism) and mental well-being. The most “realistic” 
participants, i.e. those scoring lowest on positive illusions, 
are people with low self-esteem or mildly and severely 
depressed. They are able to most adequately assess a 
degree of control they exert over different events and most 
precisely judge their chances for the future. However, 
no causality has been established here, so it is not clear 
whether a positive mood or belief in one’s potential, cause 
positive illusions, or rather if these illusions make us 
happier. Research on motivation does show that positive 
beliefs are associated with a higher drive and effort to 
succeed, and thus they may just constitute a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Nonetheless, the authors claim that people 
distort reality to maintain their positive illusions, including 
high self-esteem, belief in personal efficacy, control, and 
optimistic view of the future. If this is truly the case, the 
role of positive illusions and overconfidence as a whole 
should not be underestimated, and its impact on economic 
and financial behaviour in the real-world setting should be 
carefully studied. 
3. Overconfidence in finance
Economists started implementing psychological findings 
into economic models starting in the 1970s, but the most 
rapid development of that trend began in the 1990s. Since 
then, overconfidence has also become a field of interest 
for economists, mainly in the context of behaviour 
on financial markets. Overconfidence is defined here 
usually as an overestimation of one’s knowledge or 
precision of private information, or the interpretation 
thereof. Alternatively, an underestimation of variance of 
signals or volatility of asset values are also considered. 
Some puzzles found on the financial markets, which 
previously could not be solved using the standard 
economic theory, were successfully accounted for once 
overconfidence of investors was assumed. These issues 
include primarily continuing securities misvaluations, 
excessive trading volumes and the disposition effect, 
i.e. a tendency to sell well-performing stocks and 
to hold on to losing ones. The potential presence of 
overconfidence on the markets and its persistence in the 
longer term spurred an on-going discussion on the well-
established idea of efficient markets and economic agent 
rationality. Despite some scepticism among economists 
on the existence and effect of overconfidence as such, 
its prevalence on financial markets has been proven 
repeatedly, through methods ranging from experimental 
and questionnaire studies to formal models and financial 
market data. 
A field less explored is the existence and possible 
implications of overconfidence in the corporate finance 
context. Assuming the prevalence of overconfidence 
as a common human characteristic, its existence in 
the corporate environment may not be ruled out. 
Nonetheless, research on its implications for corporates 
has developed only very recently and remains a growing 
field. The limited scope of available data presents 
some obstacles, and its interpretation does not always 
provide straightforward answers, unlike the investor 
trading data from the financial market. The two main 
directions of overconfidence research in the context of 
corporate finance are studies of merger and acquisition 
activities of corporates and analyses of internal corporate 
financing structures. Corporate mergers and acquisitions 
have been under academic scrutiny for some time 
now and numerous researchers suggest that their 
impact is not necessarily only positive in terms of 
shareholder gains. This becomes especially interesting 
nowadays, when large corporate “divorces” start taking 
place.11 Overconfidence studies follow this critical path 
and indicate that some mergers may originate from 
overconfident CEOs overestimating their knowledge 
or their positive influence on profitability of merged 
companies, and the result for shareholders can prove 
11  For example the split-up of Daimler and Chrysler in 2007.
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negative. As to the corporate financial structure, the 
existing overconfidence research focuses on the optimal 
proportion of debt versus equity financing of new 
investments and a possible over-dependence on free cash-
flow in that respect. The timing of executing managerial 
stock options is used as a proxy for overconfidence here, 
as overconfident managers are prone to believe in their 
ability to keep the share price rising so they refrain from 
realising the options they hold. The potentially crucial 
implications of overconfidence for the performance and 
risk profile of corporates make this field an important 
addition to the standard corporate finance models.
3.1. Overconfidence on financial markets
The presence and impact of overconfidence on 
financial markets is analysed through experimental and 
questionnaire studies, borrowed from psychology, and 
through standard economic tools of formal modelling 
and data analysis. The experimental and questionnaire 
methodologies face the usual criticisms, including non-
representative sampling, small sample size, artificially 
generated problems and laboratory conditions different 
from the real-world environment. Nevertheless they 
allow to outline new research directions and hypotheses, 
which are subsequently analysed through formal 
economic modelling and verified by market data analysis. 
In the following sections we will present overconfidence 
research referring to financial markets in the context of 
all of the above tools.
Experimental and questionnaire studies
The existence of overconfidence on financial markets 
is demonstrated experimentally in varying conditions. 
Overconfidence of financial experts, including 
professional traders and investment bankers, proves 
higher than that of lay men (students) in different 
experimental tasks (taken from the area of finance) 
designed by Glaser and Weber (2005). Although personal 
overconfidence levels across domains and tasks fluctuate, 
a permanent rank-order is maintained confirming stable 
individual differences. However, the frequently assumed 
relation between the two aspects of overconfidence, 
the miscalibration and the better-than-average effect, 
is disconfirmed here. On an experimental asset market 
with varying private information, constructed by Biais 
et al. (2005), overconfidence of participants is diagnosed 
through a general knowledge question set. Miscalibrated 
(overconfident) agents perform worse than their better-
calibrated counterparts. In addition, despite the fact 
that miscalibration itself is approximately the same for 
both men and women, it reduces trading performance 
in the experimental market only for men, who turn 
out to be much more active traders than women. The 
usual relation originating from investor data, stipulating 
that overconfident investors trade more, is not found 
here.12 This may be partly due to a narrow definition of 
overconfidence assumed by Biais et al. (2005), namely 
the general knowledge miscalibration. This hypothesis 
is confirmed in Glaser and Weber’s (2007) study of a 
direct relation between investor overconfidence and 
trading volume, where only the better-than-average 
effect is demonstrated to correspond with higher 
trading volumes. Miscalibration, defined here as overly 
tight probability distributions and underestimation of 
volatilities, bears no relation to trading volumes. Both 
facets of overconfidence are measured by Glaser and 
Weber (2007) through questionnaire studies and are 
subsequently analysed in conjunction with investor 
trading data, which is a rare and valuable study of direct 
links between overconfidence and financial market 
behaviour. Usually investor overconfidence levels are 
determined with the use of proxies and, as a result, 
the direct impact of overconfidence itself can be easily 
questioned. The prevalence of all overconfidence facets 
on an individual investor level is confirmed in a 
large questionnaire study of De Bondt (1998). This 
consists of the better-than-average effect, the illusion 
of control and unrealistic optimism, as investors are 
overly optimistic about the performance of shares they 
themselves own but not about the level of the stock 
index in general. Moreover, individual investors are 
miscalibrated and their confidence intervals as to the 
variability of security prices are always too narrow. In 
addition, they underestimate the covariation in returns 
between their own portfolio and the market index, 
which again could originate from the better-than-average 
effect (De Bondt 1998).
The potentially dynamic nature of overconfidence 
remains one of the unresolved issues in psychology 
and is also discussed in finance, especially in the 
context of introducing appropriate incentives spurring 
or diminishing overconfidence when needed. In an 
experimental asset market where agents trade one risky 
asset, Maciejovsky and Kirchler (2002) find the largest 
overconfidence towards the end of the experiment, 
when the participants gain more experience and start to 
rely more heavily on their (overestimated) knowledge. 
This finding indicates that overconfidence may be 
subject to modifications, which goes back to the crucial 
role of clear, rapid feedback in shaping individual 
overconfidence levels (Russo, Schoemaker 1992).
Theoretical models
In behavioural finance models analysed below, 
overconfidence is often interpreted as: 
– investors overestimating the precision of their 
information (sometimes more specifically: overestimating 
12  For a more detailed discussion on trading volume and overconfidence please 
see the sub-section “Financial market data”.
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private signals and underestimating the public ones), 
– and/or investors underestimating risk, which 
makes them e.g. hold riskier portfolios. 
Assuming the existence of such (and similar) facets 
of overconfidence, they are analysed as to their effects 
on financial markets, including: excessive trading 
volumes, trading profitability, short- and long-term 
asset misvaluations and stock returns. Various scenarios 
proving the persistence of overconfidence on the market 
are also frequently modelled. 
Odean (1998) assumes that traders, insiders and 
marketmakers may unconsciously overestimate the 
precision of their information and rely on it more than 
is warranted, while traders display the better-than-
average effect, evaluating their information as better 
than that of their peers. Such overconfident market 
participants cause an increase in the trading volume. 
The same results are demonstrated by Benos (1998) in 
his model of an auction market with informed traders, 
where again the participation of risk-neutral investors 
overestimating the precision of their information leads 
to an increased trading volume.13 Overconfidence 
can also lead to larger market depth and volatility 
(Odean 1998; Benos 1998), as well as higher market 
efficiency, lower expected results (utility) of traders, 
market underreaction to new information of rational 
traders (Odean 1998) and more informative prices 
(Benos 1998). 
There is no consensus as to the effect of 
overconfidence on trading profits. The speculative trading 
model with asymmetric information constructed by Kyle 
and Wang (1997) predicts that overconfident traders 
with overly tight distribution intervals of private signals 
may be perceived as trading more aggressively and may 
make a higher profit than their rational opponents. A 
similar conclusion is reached by Benos (1998), where 
despite the fact that both overconfident and rational 
traders realise each other’s propensities (to trade more 
or less aggressively), the overconfident traders enjoy a 
“first mover’s advantage” and achieve higher individual 
profits. This does not result from higher risk-taking, but 
is due to the aggressive trading approach. In the model 
of De Long et al. (1990) noise traders also achieve higher 
profits than rational traders, but this is a premium for 
an increased level of risk they themselves create. De 
Long et al. (1991) in turn examine noise traders who are 
overconfident as they underestimate risk and thus the 
assets they hold are more risky, but earn higher expected 
returns.
On the other hand, Gervais and Odean (2001) 
assume overconfident traders realise, on average, lower 
gains, as they increase both trading volume and volatility, 
which in turn negatively affect their trading results. 
Daniel et al. (1998) in their model also demonstrate 
13  Empirical studies of the excessive trading volume using financial market data 
are discussed in the following section.
that overconfident informed investors are loss-making, 
on average, but indicate that profits of overconfident 
traders can in some cases exceed profits of rational 
investors, and indeed Daniel et al. (2001) make such an 
assumption. 
A broad spectrum of possible overconfidence effects 
on the security market is analysed by Daniel et al. 
(1998; 2001). The first model assumes that investors 
are overconfident only towards private (and not public) 
signals, similarly to Odean (1998).14 Daniel et al. (1998) 
present a complex model of overconfidence and biased 
self-attribution of investors, where security market under- 
and overreactions follow – respectively – public and 
private signals. Such overconfidence effects imply long-
run negative autocorrelation in stock returns and excess 
volatility. Daniel et al. (1998) consider both static and time-
varying confidence. Adding a self-attribution bias to the 
overconfidence effect, makes confidence fluctuate in the 
model, similarly as in Gervais and Odean (2001).15 Investor 
confidence increases after confirming evidence of previous 
private signals is received. However, if previous private 
information is disconfirmed, investor confidence falls only 
slightly, if at all. This results in short-term momentum in 
security prices (an overreaction), which is reversed in the 
long run as further public information modifies the stock 
price back towards the fundamentals. Other issues are also 
studied within the overconfidence framework, including 
detailed analysis of volatility around public and private 
signals and relations between stock misvaluations and 
selective events announcement effects.
Daniel et al. (2001) present an asset pricing model 
with overconfidence causing a mispricing of securities in 
equilibrium. The pricing errors are exploited by some rational 
market participants through arbitrage, but are not fully 
eliminated due to risk aversion. The model studies expected 
future returns on securities as a function of both risk and 
investor misvaluation. In order to jointly demonstrate the effect 
of risk aversion, multiple risky securities and arbitrageurs, 
Daniel et al. (2001) analyse only static overconfidence in a 
single period, in contrast to the earlier intertemporal model. 
Chuang and Lee (2006) put together a complex 
theoretical model of major findings on overconfidence in 
behavioural finance and then evaluate it empirically.16 
They provide both theoretical and empirical evidence for 
their four hypotheses: overconfidence causing investor 
over- and underreactions to private vs. public information 
(see Daniel et al. 1998, Odean 1998), experienced market 
gains resulting in increasingly aggressive trading (e.g. 
Gervais, Odean 2001; De Long et al. 1991; Kyle and Wang 
1997; Benos 1998), persistent excessive volatility being due 
to excessive trading of overconfident market participants 
14  Similar assumptions are frequently made in other models, e.g. Hirshleifer 
and Luo (2001). 
15  The self-attribution bias is another name for the psychological effect of a 
self-serving bias in self-assessment (described in section 2.2.), where success is 
attributed to internal reasons (e.g. skill) and failure to external ones (e.g. luck). 
16  See the next sub-section for the description of the empirical part.
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(Benos 1998, Daniel et al. 1998; Odean 1998; Gervais, 
Odean 2001), and overconfident traders underestimating 
risk (Hirshleifer, Luo 2001 – see below).17
Persistence of overconfidence on the market in 
the long term is modelled by various authors through 
different mechanisms. Fund management companies may 
promote overconfidence through incentive schemes, to 
profit from the traders’ more aggressive behaviour (Kyle, 
Wang 1997). Basing on the concepts of informational 
cascades, herding and group selection, Bernardo and 
Welch (2001) show how overconfident individuals 
provide their social groups with valuable information. 
Such “outsiders” behave against the general “herding” 
direction of their group, and although this may be to the 
individuals’ detriment, it allows the group to explore 
possibilities that otherwise would not be considered. 
Thus groups with a certain proportion of overconfident 
“entrepreneurs” have an evolutionary advantage over 
groups with no overconfidence, and overconfidence 
can survive. Even in the dynamic approach of Gervais 
and Odean (2001), despite the fact that overconfidence 
is driven out of the market on an individual basis, it 
remains present on the aggregate level. The authors 
assume biased self-attribution, where people attribute 
success more to their own doing rather than to external 
factors (such as luck) and overconfidence is allowed 
to change over time and be influenced by learning. In 
consequence, originally rational traders may learn to 
be overconfident in a dynamic process, as they wrongly 
link their success in forecasting dividends with superior 
own abilities. At a certain point, however, experienced 
traders recognise their true abilities, benefiting from 
frequent, rapid and clear feedback and their individual 
overconfidence diminishes. Nonetheless, overconfidence 
on the aggregate level is not driven out of the market, as 
old, better calibrated traders die or leave the market and 
new overconfident ones arrive constantly. 
Another potential reason for overconfidence 
persisting on the market is presented by Hirshleifer and 
Luo (2001). Overconfident traders are more aggressive 
than their rational counterparts in exploiting mispricings 
brought about by noise or liquidity traders. As a result, 
they are more profitable, too. They trade aggressively 
due to two effects: their underestimation of risk and 
overestimation of own trading strategies. Even without the 
underestimation of risk, crucial in De Long et al. (1991), 
the model of Hirshleifer and Luo (2001) demonstrates 
that the high profits of overconfident traders would 
also arise, solely due to the second effect, being simply 
the overreaction in mean assessments by overconfident 
investors, making them exploit their information more 
intensely and thus trading more aggressively. As a result, 
given a replication of trader types in accordance to the 
17  All of these items are presented throughout this section (in a slightly differ-
ent order), and the theoretical part of Chuang and Lee (2006) is largely based on 
the original models mentioned, so we shall not develop it further.
profitability of their trades, overconfident traders survive 
in the long run.18 This conclusion of Hirshleifer and Luo 
(2001) is strengthened in a dynamic setting, as they 
assume that overconfident traders learn very little (if at 
all) from past experiences, due to the already mentioned 
self-attribution bias. Overconfidence can thus persist 
even if overconfident traders lose money. Hirshleifer and 
Luo (2001) hold trader confidence steady also during 
periods of high profitability. This is unlike the dynamic 
learning model of Gervais and Odean (2001), where 
confidence fluctuates depending on trading outcomes, 
which intuitively seems closer to the reality of financial 
markets. 
Financial market data
Despite the numerous experimental and questionnaire 
studies, as well as the rapidly developing field of 
theoretical modelling, it is the analysis of financial market 
data that has marked a turning point in overconfidence 
research in finance. The widely quoted works of Terrance 
Odean and the co-authors (see: Odean 1999; Barber, 
Odean 2000; 2001), analysing trading data of individual 
investors taken from a large US brokerage firm, allowed 
overconfidence to evolve from a neglected psychological 
side-effect to a widely accepted factor influencing 
financial markets and investor behaviour. Following 
Odean’s lead, this field of analysis continues to develop, 
despite the ever-present difficulties in obtaining suitable 
investment data. 
The high turnover rates observed nowadays on 
world stock exchanges cannot be accounted for by 
the trading needs of rational investors. In fact, the 
profitability of active trading may equally be questioned, 
among other things through the existence of a so-called 
disposition effect, a tendency to hold on to losing 
securities and to sell the well-performing ones.19 Odean 
(1999) proves this effect on a 1987–1993 data set of 
10,000 accounts with trading records obtained from a 
US brokerage house. He finds that a frequent portfolio 
turnover not only does not guarantee higher income, but 
may be detrimental to the final result.
One of the possible explanations for the excessive 
trading volume in financial markets overall is the 
overconfidence hypothesis. The fact that trading is 
excessive can be proven, among others, by the lower 
performance of active traders in comparison to those 
who trade less. Such results are demonstrated by 
Barber and Odean (2000) on the 1991–1997 trading 
records of over 35,000 US households taken from 
a nationwide brokerage firm. The accounts with the 
18  Hirshleifer and Luo (2001) show that overconfident traders can even fully 
drive rational peers out of the market, if they display a sufficiently high degree of 
risk aversion, and there is a large volatility of noise trading or of the underlying 
security payoff.
19  The disposition effect and its implications are described in detail by Shefrin 
and Statman (1985).
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highest turnover are the lowest performers. Following 
down that path, the link between overconfidence and 
excessive trading volume is established on the same 
data set by Barber and Odean (2001). Gender is used 
as a proxy for overconfidence, basing on psychological 
research stipulating possible higher overconfidence of 
men, especially in tasks perceived to be masculine.20 
Although in fact psychology does not unanimously link 
gender to overconfidence, Barber and Odean (2001) 
confirm that overconfident traders (men) in their sample 
trade more than women. As a result, the performance of 
men is more hurt by excessive trading.
Chuang and Lee (2006) use data of US listed 
companies in the period of 1963-2001, to prove a 
variety of effects of overconfidence on financial markets. 
They find evidence for overreactions to private and 
underreactions to public signals, as well as the existence 
of the short-term momentum and long-term reversal, 
such as those suggested by Daniel et al. (1998). The 
assumptions of Gervais and Odean (2001), that trading 
profits induce overconfident investors to trade more 
frequently, are also confirmed empirically, both by 
Chuang and Lee (2006) and by Statman et al. (2003). 
In addition, Chuang and Lee (2006) provide support for 
investors displaying a self-attribution bias (putting more 
weight on their forecasts that prove to be correct, and less 
on those that turn out wrong), for high market volatility 
being due to the presence of investor overconfidence, 
and for overconfident investors being prone to trade 
more in relatively riskier securities, after experiencing 
market gains. 
An increasing amount of research emerges where 
overconfidence in financial analysts’ forecasts is 
analysed. The studies are based on large samples in 
the form of long-running panel data, are recurrent, 
and therefore distinct from the usually small-scale, 
targeted questionnaire studies described above. Based on 
survey data of financial market participants in Germany 
and using their confidence interval assessments of 
the stock exchange index DAX six months in advance, 
Deaves et al. (2005) study overconfidence of financial 
experts, defined here explicitly as miscalibration. Market 
participants are not only clearly miscalibrated, but their 
past success leads to higher overconfidence, both on the 
individual level and equally on the market as a whole. 
The same conclusion for individuals is reached by 
Hilary and Menzly (2006) on a large 1980–1997 sample 
of financial analyst predictions of corporate quarterly 
results. These empirical findings are in line with the 
model of overconfidence as a dynamic process rather 
than a stable trait (Gervais, Odean 2001). No consensus 
as to the learning from experience is reached however, 
as Deaves et al. (2005) do not confirm this, while both 
Gervais and Odean (2001) and Hilary and Menzly (2006) 
20  See Section 2.1. “Reasons for overconfidence” for a description of masculine 
tasks. Barber and Odean (2001) assume finance to also be a “masculine” area.
find that past experiences allow forecasters to realise their 
true abilities and adjust their assessments accordingly 
(even if this adjustment is short-termed only, as in Hilary 
and Menzly 2006). Friesen and Weller (2006) estimate 
their theoretical model of overconfidence and cognitive 
dissonance, defined as a “psychological discomfort 
that accompanies evidence that contradicts one’s prior 
beliefs or world view” (p. 342), which lies close to the 
confirmatory bias phenomenon (i.e. a tendency to seek 
evidence confirming our already formed hypothesis and 
disregard evidence contrary to our beliefs). Friesen and 
Weller (2006) formally prove overconfidence of financial 
analysts, seen as an overestimation of private information 
value, and verify it empirically using earnings forecasts. 
Interestingly, analysts seem to accommodate for the 
cognitive bias in the behaviour of other analysts, but do 
not apply it to their own forecasts. 
3.2. Overconfidence and corporate finance
Overconfidence research concerning financial markets 
has continued to develop rapidly since the 1990s. 
Studies of overconfidence in the corporate context, 
however, are not equally advanced and are much less 
numerous. An easier access to data sets, such as analysts 
forecasts, stock market performance and turnover, and 
their potentially more straightforward interpretation 
could play a role here. Moreover, an internal nature of 
decision making within corporate structures make it 
challenging to separate overconfidence from other factors 
that affect corporate performance. To date, two main 
directions in the overconfidence research on corporates 
have emerged: analysis of mergers and acquisitions and 
corporate financial structure studies. 
Mergers and acquisitions
An early work on the role of overconfidence in mergers 
and acquisitions (m&a’s) by Roll (1986) stipulates that 
these may not be driven only, or primarily, by potential 
gains detected by the acquirer, but may result from 
managerial hubris. Although overconfidence as such is 
not named explicitly here, managerial hubris understood 
as “an overbearing presumption of bidders that their 
valuations are correct” (p. 200) lies very close to later 
definitions of overconfident traders, who overestimate 
the precision of their information and are willing to 
act on it (e.g. Odean 1998). The potential downside of 
managerial hubris in m&a activities is overpaying for 
target firms and negative net final effects of acquisitions 
for combined shareholders, in terms of stock valuation. 
At the same time, the role of individual, managerial 
decision-making in m&a’s is underlined, building a 
solid argument against a later theory of Fama (1998) on 
behavioural anomalies cancelling out in the aggregate on 
an efficient market. Acquisitions are obviously strongly 
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driven by company CEOs or management boards at best, 
which do not have the same potential of cancelling out 
individual irrationalities as e.g. a population of traders in 
a financial market. Although Roll himself demonstrates 
mixed evidence for gains and losses from mergers, 
the important conclusion that behavioural biases may 
influence m&a’s paves the way for further research. 
Loosely following Roll’s argumentation, Malmendier 
and Tate (2006) analyse corporate m&a’s empirically, 
using a 1980–1994 data set for nearly 400 US companies. 
An innovative proxy for overconfidence is constructed, 
building on the concepts of biased self-attribution 
(CEOs attribute the success of their companies to their 
own influence) and the better-than-average effect (they 
believe their company will perform better than others 
on the market), with unrealistic optimism and illusion of 
control coming into play as well. Overconfident CEOs are 
assumed to delay the execution of stock options they have 
received (as compensation), because they “overestimate 
the returns they can generate in their own company” 
(Malmendier, Tate 2006, p. 1–2). As a result, they believe 
that the stock price of their company shares will continue 
to rise. This first measure is completed by a second, 
more straightforward proxy for overconfidence, namely 
the press portrayal of CEOs presented in the leading 
business publications.21 Thus identified overconfident 
CEOs in the sample are empirically proven not only to be 
more likely to conduct mergers than their rational peers, 
but the mergers they perform are also prone to be much 
less favourable. These are for example acquisitions of 
companies outside the core activities of the acquiring 
firm, considered in the literature as potentially value-
destroying. In addition, overconfident CEOs believe 
their companies to be undervalued and prefer internal 
financing, making merger activity dependent on free 
cash-flow or abundant internal resources.22 Moreover, 
acquiring firms headed by overconfident CEOs suffer 
from higher negative price effects on stock prices 
than their rational counterparts, following merger 
announcements. As a result, overconfident CEOs not 
only engage more actively in acquisitions of little, if any, 
added value for their shareholders, but also possibly pay 
higher premiums for these bids.
Corporate structure
A frequent reference point in research on overconfidence 
and potentially biased behaviour in the corporate context 
is a questionnaire study done by March and Shapira 
(1987) on risk taking attitudes of managers. Although it 
does not target overconfidence per se, it demonstrates 
that managerial decision making diverges significantly 
from the standard decision making theory. Managers do 
21  The two overconfidence measures are found to correlate and both are used. 
22  For the belief of CEOs in undervaluation of their companies, see also the 
next section. 
not view risk in strictly probabilistic terms and reducing 
it into a single number is viewed with scepticism. 
The magnitude of possible loss matters more than its 
likelihood, and risk in general is approached much more 
intuitively than implied by standard decision research. 
On the other hand, managers seem to be under the 
impression that they are able to, at least partially, control 
risks and in that respect they view themselves as risk 
takers rather than gamblers, which can be seen as an 
illusion of control. At the same time, managers believe 
they are more risk-seeking than their colleagues, which 
in conjunction with a view that “good managers have 
to take risks” demonstrates a clear better-than-average 
effect. 
A striking and very strong presence of overconfidence, 
mainly in terms of the better-than-average effect and 
unrealistic optimism, is demonstrated in an experiment 
on business start-ups performed by Camerer and Lovallo 
(1999). Although the majority of potential business 
founders recognises that most new businesses fail, 
they predict their own profit to be positive. As a result, 
despite the existing and easily available statistics on 
a high proportion of new business failures, there will 
always be an excess of start-ups in comparison to market 
capacity. This is caused by overconfidence of business 
founders, who strongly believe in their relative skill. 
The experimental results of Camerer and Lovallo (1999) 
confirm the better-than average effect in the behaviour 
of most business owners, who forecast negative returns 
for an average market participant, with themselves 
being an exception to the rule. Overconfidence becomes 
even stronger when subjects self-select into skill-related 
sessions, knowing that other participants of these 
sessions have self-selected too and thus their peer group 
“quality” is likely to be high. Camerer and Lovallo (1999) 
name this a “reference group neglect”, which potentially 
prevents people from gathering enough information 
on a peer group while entering into a competition. 
Participants are thus insensitive as to whether their 
competitors are forced to compete or choose to compete. 
An important implication arises here for hierarchical 
tournaments, where winners gradually advance to higher 
levels of competition. Overconfidence on each level is 
prone to increase, instead of decreasing, as implied by 
standard rational assumptions. Camerer and Lovallo 
(1999) link the reference group neglect with the “inside 
view” concept of Kahneman and Lovallo (1993). There, 
the focus lies on own abilities and resources and little 
attention is paid to statistical data or analysis of similar 
cases, leading to faulty judgment and biased forecasts.
Unrealistic optimism in a corporate setting is 
exposed in Heaton’s (2002) theoretical model, where 
overconfident managers “systematically overestimate the 
probability of good firm performance and underestimate 
the probability of bad firm performance” (p.33). As 
a result, optimistic managers believe their company 
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securities to be undervalued by the market and thus 
they prefer to finance potential new investments through 
internal funds, i.e. free cash flow. The availability of free 
cash flow is regarded to have diverging effects, depending 
on the corporate setting. It is viewed as positive in cases 
when in its absence profitable investments would be 
dropped because of the excessive cost of external 
financing, wrongly assessed by overconfident managers. 
On the other hand, overconfident managers also tend to 
overvalue the firm’s future cash flows and investment 
opportunities, and in the presence of free cash flow 
they may undertake investments with negative net 
present value. Free cash flow has a negative impact 
in this case. Another important prediction later used 
by other researchers in the overconfidence context 
is the pecking order of capital structure preferences, 
which assumes that managers display the strongest 
preference for internal financing, followed by debt, 
and then by equity. The bulk of Heaton’s (2002) 
model was empirically verified by Malmendier and 
Tate (2005) on a corporate panel data for nearly 
500 largest US companies between 1980 and 1994. 
Managerial optimism is extended here to more general 
overconfidence, defined as an overestimation of own 
skill (the better-than-average effect) and biased self-
attribution. Overconfidence is assessed using a proxy 
of a delay in stock option execution and additional 
stock acquisitions by CEOs, which thus reveal that 
they overestimate a positive influence they personally 
exert on the value of company share prices in the 
future. Malmendier and Tate (2005) follow Heaton’s 
(2002) argumentation, stipulating that overconfident 
CEOs consider the market valuation of their company 
as too low and restrict external financing through new 
share issues, so that the existing (undervalued) shares 
are not diluted any further. The data confirms these 
hypotheses, and managers identified as overconfident 
through the delay in stock option execution measure 
are found to make corporate investments more a 
function of cash flow than their non-overconfident 
peers. In consequence, the level of investment in 
companies with overconfident CEOs depends on 
the abundance of free cash flow and may be sub-
optimal. This is an alternative explanation to the 
traditional solutions of the problem of investment 
distortions, namely the misalignment of managerial 
and shareholder interests and asymmetric information 
between corporate insiders and the capital market. As 
a result, standard measures undertaken to mitigate the 
corporate investment distortions, such as stock- and 
option-based compensation are unlikely to be effective 
due to managerial overconfidence (Malmendier, Tate 
2005).
Using survey data from CFOs in US corporates 
for the period 2001ć2006, Ben-David et al. (2007) 
find significant miscalibration in predictions of short- 
and long-term stock market returns. The usual results 
from psychological research are confirmed, as the 
provided distribution probabilities prove too narrow 
in comparison with confidence intervals. However, 
the index constructed by Ben-David et al. (2007) 
measures overconfidence also in terms of unrealistic 
optimism rather than purely standard miscalibration, 
usually understood as an overestimation of one’s 
knowledge. In addition, this optimism is not company-
specific, but regards the general performance of the 
stock market. Stipulations of the dynamic nature of 
overconfidence (Gervais, Odean 2001; Hilary, Menzly 
2006) are confirmed, as better recent performance of 
the market as a whole and the specific company as such 
both result in higher confidence of predictions in the 
subsequent period. Overconfidence grows weakly with 
age, education and skill but is unrelated to professional 
experience or gender. Ben-David et al. (2007) also find 
empirical support for corporate policy assumptions of 
Heaton (2002) and Malmendier and Tate (2005), as firms 
of overconfident CFOs are found to behave as if they 
were undervalued by the market. Corporates employing 
overconfident CFOs rely more heavily on cash flow, have 
higher average investment (in particular in acquisition of 
other firms), hold longer maturities of debt, and perform 
higher own share repurchasing following a share price 
decline and lower share issue following a share price 
increase. 
Despite the fact that overconfidence in the corporate 
context needs further research, the results presented 
above demonstrate that it may affect profitability and 
financing structure of companies, as well as their growth 
through acquisitions, indirectly determining the returns 
or losses generated by potential shareholders.
4. Conclusion
Stemming from research on calibration and 
probability, overconfidence has become an 
important interdisciplinary concept. Its structure 
and development are currently studied from both a 
psychological and an economic perspective. Some 
discussions, as to the origins of overconfidence, its 
dynamic or stable character and its dependence on the 
study context, continue in both fields. 
The existence of an economic effect of 
overconfidence on individuals and markets, be it in 
the context of miscalibration or positive illusions, has 
been established through both theoretical models and 
financial data analysis. Puzzles such as excessive trading 
volumes or security misvaluations on financial markets 
can be explained at least partly with reference to 
overconfidence. Even if the degree and direction of the 
effect of overconfidence on some variables, such as 
trading profits, are not agreed upon, the phenomenon 
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itself has been helpful in explaining a significant 
range of financial market phenomena. Overconfidence 
in the context of corporate finance has potentially 
an even larger meaning. The individual character of 
decision making in companies, on the level of CEOs 
and management boards, not only allows for personal 
biases such as overconfidence, but may even strengthen 
them. In corporates there is no critical mass of other, 
rational participants with the same degree of power 
(as e.g. other traders on financial markets) that could 
cancel out overconfident managerial decisions. As a 
result, overconfidence could potentially play a much 
more significant role in the decisions made in the 
corporate environment. However, an early stage of 
research in that field does not yet provide answers to 
such questions as whether overconfidence effects are 
positive or negative, or if there exists an “optimal” level 
of managerial overconfidence, from the point of view of 
company profits. Although establishing causality proves 
challenging here, innovative proxies for overconfidence, 
such as the stock option execution delay proposed by 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) pave the way for further 
research. Last but not least, a growing cooperation 
between psychologists and economists offers more 
chances to fully draw from both disciplines and build 
more coherent, common concepts.
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